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abstract
Considering being political not as a status, but rather as an act that demands both capacity and action 
as its necessary conditions, I see being a political agent not as a permanent condition, but rather in 
a twofold dimension of potentiality and actuality. Moreover, I contend that the right to vote is not a 
necessary, nor a sufficient condition for being a political actor, although such a right can enhance 
our possibilities of having a say, augmenting one’s degree of political agency. This means that those 
individuals who are deprived of the right to vote, undocumented migrants in particular, can nonetheless 
be political agents in the polity. Indeed, notwithstanding the importance attached to the right to vote 
and to citizenship as fundamental for political participation, I claim that undocumented migrants are 
political although lacking the legal voting means of participation. Although much of the debate around 
migrants’ political participation has centred around the extension of the right to vote to migrants, there 
are in fact other rights that require attention. Moreover, even if we consider the right to vote as essential 
to protect people from abuses granting them a say within the polity, the arguments that have been 
proposed fail when it comes to recognize the rights and the political agency of undocumented migrants. 
In my understanding, migrants become political agents by their very same acting in the city, deserving 
to be heard and let free to express themselves in voicing their claims as subjects of justice, autonomous 
individuals, final units of our moral concern.
keywords
migration, political participation, human rights, cosmopolitanism
* I thank Dragan Kuljanin, Janos Kis and the anonymous reviewer, along with the participants of the 2018 Spring 
School “Unpacking Political Agency: Equality, Vulnerability, Discrimination” held at the University of San Raffaele in 
Milan, for having provided valuable comments to different drafts of this paper. 
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Much of the philosophical debate on migrants’ agency revolves around granting migrants 
political rights, intended, for the most part, as voting rights. Such a debate, I believe, starts 
from the assumption that being a full political agent is necessary to be considered as an 
equal participant to the polity and protected by the state, which, in turn, would require 
voting rights. On the contrary, what I want to argue in this paper is that the possibility of 
being political and so be recognized as a legitimate rights claimant, does not necessarily 
depend on having voting rights, but rather on a different set of rights and conditions. 
Considering being political not as a status, but as an act that demands both capacity and 
action as its necessary conditions, I see being a political agent not as a permanent status, 
but in a twofold dimension of potentiality and actuality. In such a framework, I contend 
that the right to vote is not a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for being a political actor, 
although such a right may enhance one’s possibilities of having a say, augmenting one’s 
degree of political agency. 
What is fundamental is instead having been granted the right to public appearance and 
public speech, which implies that the state has to refrain from interfering with acts of public 
appearance even of those individuals who happen to be sans-papiers. 
Indeed, notwithstanding the importance attached to the right to vote considered fundamental 
for political participation, often discussed in the broader context of the enlargement of 
citizenship, I claim that undocumented migrants ought to be recognized as political subjects 
although lacking the legal voting means of participation. 
The idea of the political derives from the polis as the locus where citizens raised their 
concerns and discussed issues pertaining the community. The polis was the city as the 
political, cultural and social centre, it was the physical arena of debate. Acting required debate, 
most importantly interaction with others, equally part of the decision-making assembly 
(Arendt, 1963) which had to decide about how to promote the common good and what counted 
as such. Those, whose knowledge or virtue rendered highly respectable were primi inter pares. 
Still, only some could participate, those who were actually citizens, women and foreigners 
were excluded from the debate and treated as objects as opposed to subjects of justice.  
Given the above we can then wonder what it means to be political today, so to better 
understand who can be political and how to be political. 
I do believe that being political implies having both the capacity to act and exercise such a 




speaking, to have a capacity to act means to have the intellectual means to grasp simple and 
basic concepts, being able to distinguish right from wrong, to have a sense of justice (cf. Rawls, 
1999) and understand one’s plan of life in the broader context of the community one lives in. 
Agency in its political dimension, requires the capacity and possibility to appear in the public 
space, exercising the capacity to communicate with others, promoting a particular vision of 
society, engaging in debates about the public good where one is capable of giving reasons 
that can be understood by the counterparts. Acting politically entails questioning the power 
structure and the organisation of the polis and the kind of distributions of resources and rights 
that happen in it. Political agency as exercise thus implies taking part in those processes that 
constitute decision-making moments or that set the future debate, triggering questions, doubts 
and criticisms with regard to how certain resources – goods and rights – are to be shared. In 
particular, political deliberation concerns how and when state intervention is required, which 
ones, of the obligations individuals have to each other, have to be backed by legal decisions. The 
question at the core of the political debate is what the state owes to us and vice-versa, what we 
owe to the state. A political action or discourse, to be political, has to question the permissibility 
of certain actions, the rights and duties we have towards the state as the intermediary between 
us and the others, and the limits of state actions themselves. This requires having access to 
spaces of debate and be part of a community whose interests are taken into consideration. 
The act to debate such political matters might include, but is not restricted to, voting, 
organising public debates and Q&A with government representatives, organising petitions 
and so on. A note worth mentioning is that although a political act requires a reference to the 
common interest, not all political actions have to be collective in their manifestation, so even 
standing in a square, alone, can become a politically loaded action1.
Having said so, I am aware of the fact that political agency is also understood in terms of 
status, when it is taken to be derived from the possession of certain voting rights coming from 
full membership to a political community, i.e. citizenship. To be a citizen, in this view, is ipso 
facto to be a political agent, as if citizenship and the voting right that comes along with it were 
the necessary and sufficient condition to exercise such a political agency. However, I believe 
this is not the case, not simply because there are other ways to influence political decisions, 
ways that can also be illegal, such as civil disobedience, but also because having certain rights 
per se is insufficient to be full political actors. 
The way to grasp this is by resorting to the distinction between potential political agent 
and actual political agent. If we consider the act of voting in a country where voting is not 
compulsory, a person who is not exercising the right to vote and does not explicitly give a 
reason for her abstention, is a political agent only in potentia2. Here in particular it is important 
to distinguish between having the right to vote and actually going to vote. What I argue is that 
if we have the capacity and the right to act but fail to do so, with respect to voting or any other 
right we might have, what we retain is merely the potentiality of being political agents, but it 
is only if we act that we become actual, active – full – actors. The very same concept of agency 
cannot be understood if not in connection with the one of action. A caveat needs to be added 
here though3, given that non-voting can also be the manifestation of a principled reason which 
aims at communicating to those in power that the entire system is flawed. It is then important 
1  See the standing man in Istanbul (Taş & Taş, 2014).
2  Of course people might have principled reasons for not even presenting themselves to the polls, but unless they 
make their reasons explicit, through a communicative, public act, we cannot a priori assume that their abstention is a 
way to communicate dissent, especially considering the fact that people can cast a blank vote in sign of protest. 
3  I thank the anonymous reviewer who highlighted this point. 
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to highlight that non voting per se does not lessen one’s degree of political agency, if the 
reasons for the abstention are morally justified in public. That is, if the choice one would make 
by going to vote is replaced by another communicative act aimed at questioning the political 
system, non voting becomes a political act. Otherwise, if non voting is performed without 
being accompanied by an explicit manifestation of reasons, it is not. 
At the same time, if we vote, but limit ourselves to vote and then we do not participate to 
the life of the community until new elections come, the period in between such elections, we 
cannot be considered full political agents, but only potential ones. In other words, while a 
person retains her capacity-agency regardless of her acting, what she loses while not acting, is 
her exercise-agency. 
Things are different in countries where voting is compulsory, of course. In such a context, 
given the mandatory nature of voting, not going to vote can actually have an even stronger 
political significance than going to the polls, but again, to consider the abstention as a political 
act of civil disobedience, its reasons should be communicated. So, not going to the polls per se 
does not make a person a potential rather than an actual agent if such a person has chosen to 
abstain for principled reasons she manifests. However, if this is not the case, and she also does 
not act in any other political way, then her lack of exercise deprives her of actual agency. 
Notwithstanding this last point, having the right to vote can enhance one’s exercise-agency4 to 
be political, giving to a person another venue where to express herself, but it is not a sufficient, 
nor a necessary condition for political agency. In other words, being endowed with voting 
rights does not make one a political agent, tout court: if a person has a right to vote and never 
exercises it, without giving public reasons of the motive that pushed her not to go and vote, 
and she does not exercise her agency in other ways, she cannot be said to be an active agent at 
all. At the same time, if a person does not hold the right to vote, this does not mean she is not 
legitimized and cannot influence the political process in other ways. What I want to point out is 
that being a citizen endowed with voting rights does not equate, ipso facto, with being political 
and so capable of influence the way the community regulates itself. In other words, the simple 
fact of having the status of citizen does not grant one political agency. At the same time, not 
being a citizen does not mean not to have a right to a political say. Ergo, the concept of political 
agency as a permanent status, linked to a legal voting right, is here dismissed, to be replaced by 
a concept of political agency as capacity and exercise, act, and so performance.
Surely, it could be said that having the right to vote provides people with an opportunity 
to have a more direct impact on the political process. Furthermore, it could be added that 
such a right enables individuals to be active at the highest possible degree, but it is not a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for this. So, especially in counties where such a right is 
not intended as a compulsory act, if a person can vote and votes, she exercises her political 
agency at a greater level than one who does not enjoy such a right. Indeed, the best way to 
think about how to be a political agent is not simply by distinguishing between potential 
and actual, but also in terms of degrees. In general, if a person enjoys a wider set of rights of 
political participation, she will have a higher degree of potential political agency than a person 
that does not but who would still retain a certain degree of political agency nonetheless, e.g. 
demonstrating and participating in other ways5. 
4  Even in countries where voting is compulsory, the very same act of voting can have the effect of giving more voice 
to those disenfranchised groups that would not vote otherwise. See in particular L. Hill, 2015. 
5  Or, it could also be said that voting per se does not even enhance one’s degree of political agency in affecting 
change, although other political rights do indeed enhance the degree of political agency. It is quite an established 
fact that even when a person votes, her single vote has such an infinitesimal impact on the final result (Downs, 1957) 
that it cannot really be taken as being necessarily more significant than other ways of participating, unless her vote is 
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To conclude this part, I contend that whenever a person expresses herself in the public 
forum, in a legal or in an illegal way, addressing the incumbents or the other residents, 
participating in setting the agenda of what should matter for the community and discussing 
how institutions should implement the obligations individuals have towards each other, she 
expresses herself in a political way. 
As I have tried to outline in the previous section, being political does not require voting 
rights. However, a great part of the literature on migrants’ political participation has quite the 
opposite focused on such a topic. 
As Song highlighted: “…it is hard to deny that the lack of voting rights translates into greater 
vulnerability to injustice. Because noncitizens lack voting rights, it is easy for political parties, 
candidates, and elected officials to ignore them”. (Song, 2009, p. 614)
To be sure, notwithstanding what has been said in the previous section, to be a voter remains 
a direct way to hold accountable those in power given the important relation existing 
between voters and elected and this explains why a great part of the debate around migrants’ 
participation has centred on granting them voting rights. However, even if we consider voting 
rights as being important to transform individuals into full political agents, i.e. empowered 
and so free from their subservient and objectified position within society, the theories I will 
present below miss their point, at least with regard to undocumented migrants.
The all subjected principle, in the formulation given by Dahl6 applies to whoever is naturally 
subjected to the laws of a country. The underlying idea is that a person is entitled to vote on 
how the law comes about, because she is subjected to this very same law7. However, although 
such an argument proves to be quite a strong one to extend the right to vote to legal residents, 
it seems more problematic when it comes to undocumented individuals. The question is 
indeed why, from a subjection they put themselves in, illegally crossing a border, should 
derive a right to participate in the political life of the community8. Of course, this question 
becomes easier to answer once we interpret the set of migration laws as laws that already 
subject to the power of the state those who are excluded. In this sense the all subjected 
principle addresses migrants as well, exactly in their being the precise target of a certain piece 
of legislation that aims to exclude them9. Still, this expansion appears problematic because it 
applies to everyone who is not a resident whether or not she has an interest in entering the 
community. In the end, the broadening of the concept deprives the very same principle of its 
function, i.e. if everyone is included in the group defined as the subjected one there is no need 
for a principle distinguishing between who is in and who is out.
A similar problem of inclusiveness is the one that poses the all affected interests: here the idea 
is that those whose interests are affected by a given decision should have a say in how this 
decision came about. The problem lies in identifying what counts as an affected interest and 
who are those affected10, given that, in its broadest definition, this principle would grant the 
the vote that changes the results of the election. Generally speaking though, voting remains important as a collective 
action and in this sense having voting rights makes individuals those power-holders are most directly accountable to.
6  “Every adult subject to a government and its laws must be presumed to be qualified as, and has an unqualified right 
to be, a member of the demos” Dahl, 1989, p. 127.
7  A point to be kept in mind is that those I am advocating for are individuals who have an interest in remaining in a given 
territory for more than a couple of months: it would be unfair that temporary residents would have a say over matters that 
will affect the community over time, while they will not be there to bear the consequences of their decisions.
8  An interesting argument, that faces the same problem is the one put forward by R. Bauböck (2007).
9  For an argument that reaches the same conclusion, although different in its construction, see Abizadeh, 2008.
10  For a much more detailed discussion on the topic see (Goodin, 2007) and Owen (2011, 2012).
2. From the alien 
to the member
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right to vote to people well beyond the borders and with no precise or lasting relationship 
with the territory they might end up voting for. 
A third approach is the one based on reciprocity. This principle states that if a person 
contributes to the common venture we have come to know as society, she is entitled to have 
a say in it. So, the argument goes, given that migrants do contribute - the state itself, tacitly 
accepts irregular migrants as economic participants that sustain the market (De Genova, 1998) 
-  they should also be allowed to participate. As McNevin reminds us, irregular migrants “are 
economically and socially integrated into locales which have developed a dependence upon 
their labour” (McNevin, 2006, p. 141) which justifies their right to have a voice in the agora 
where they de facto already belong (cf. De Genova, 1998). Drawing from Walzer, although he 
focused more precisely on guest-workers, we have to remember how political justice refuses 
the permanent status of alien, which implies that the moment a person contributes to the 
community she should have a right in deciding how goods are going to be distributed (Walzer, 
1983). Somehow this argument echoes the one of “an already active everyday recognition” 
of those who formally do not belong, but de facto do, which precisely ground a de facto 
membership to rights of political participation (De Genova quoted in McNevin, 2006, p.664).
Similarly, the social ties principle contends that migrants do have social ties and special 
bonds with host communities where they have spent a certain amount of time (Carens, 2005) 
. I then ask to what extent immigrants should enjoy the same rights as citizens and on what 
terms they should have access to citizenship itself. They are not hermits, rather they create 
connections, develop deep interests connected with the community and its members, such 
that their own well-being and the one of the host community itself become dependent on their 
presence on the territory. Such connections, I contend, could be so strong and valuable for one 
person to outweigh their illegal entry, being fundamental for the development and growth of 
the individual herself. In this sense the relevance of social ties for one’s freedom of choice and 
development could ground the extension of rights even to undocumented migrants. However, 
a principle, as well as the reciprocity one, provides reasons to extend political participation 
only to those migrants who have already established certain connections and participated to 
the good of the community, not to those who have just arrived, crossing illegally the border. 
So, we are left with the argument put forward by the neo-Roman republicans. According to 
Pettit (2010), Sager (2014) and others, granting migrants voting rights is necessary, although 
it is not sufficient, to protect them from domination. Migrants “require protection from the 
state through their power to exercise political right” (Sager, 2014, p. 207). Still, his argument 
seems insufficient to address the objection that “the extension of the franchise might lead to the 
domination of long-term residents by transients”11 (Sager, 2014, p. 207). In his answer he makes 
reference to the probability that migrants will not vote if not for serious matters, and to the 
empirical evidence that they will have a significant impact only if present in big numbers. These 
answers seem to me quite unsatisfactory from a moral point of view as a). it is not immediately 
plausible that migrants would vote differently than non-migrants and even if they voted only on 
what matters to them, this could overlap with what is also important for locals b). this argument, 
especially considering that “not all potential coercion triggers a right to political rights” (Sager, 
2014, p. 207) can sustain at most an extension to the right to vote on specific, limited matters, 
those matters the ones in charge will establish as being the ones migrants might have important 
stakes in c). Sager’s answer could not be supported in cases migrants were a large number.
Most importantly though, there is an even more serious point to raise. How is it even possible 
to vote with no papers? Identification is fundamental to exercise such a right and to prevent 
11  This objection is addressed by the stakeholder principle proposed by R. Bauböck (2007). 
74
ELETTRA REPETTO
multiple voting and I strongly believe that given this limitation, not many people would 
present themselves to exercise such a right in the first place. Also, either you are unauthorized 
on the territory and so you cannot vote, or if you vote, then you must have a sort of 
authorization, a sort of document that states that you are legitimately exercising the right to 
vote which in turn implies that you can do so because you are rightfully on the territory. 
All of the arguments above point in the direction of recognizing to undocumented migrants 
the right to vote. To be clear, in general this means advocating for migrants being transformed 
from immanent outsiders (McNevin, 2006) into legal members. Said so, and highlighting how 
the arguments provided above can, to a certain extent, be also used to justify the extension 
of the right to vote to undocumented migrants, what I want to focus on is how aliens can be 
political actors even lacking voting rights. 
Indeed, although in general I do not want to disregard the importance of the right to vote, 
I believe voting is neither necessary nor sufficient for allowing people to speak and protect 
themselves from power-holders and I want to highlight how others can be the ways for people 
to gain their political dimension and be heard in their voicing their claims and requests, even 
if they not are – and may never be – part of the constituency.
The key point here lies in the dimension of communication and action, to go back to Arendt, 
which implies that not having political voting or membership rights does not mean being 
incapable of influencing decisions. The idea is to decouple the concept of political agency 
from the one of legal membership endowed with voting rights, or citizenship12. The political 
requires actions13 to be performed in a public forum where grievances can be expressed and 
where dialogue and conflict become possible. In other words, it requires communication as 
one of its necessary elements, a communication that involves and regards the community 
as a whole. Such a dialogue necessitates a performance, an appearance, being impossible 
if not spoken in public as a form of mobilization undertaken to communicate with the 
decision-makers. 
A political agent then is not simply a thinking animal, but rather a social animal living in 
the city and acting within it: to be considered politically active a person needs to actively 
exercise her mental capacity for action. Silence and invisibility, the distinctive features of 
alienation and inaction, manifest the social death of the person as a political agent. Framing 
the political in terms of action and manifestation renders evident how such a capacity to 
think and act is not a prerogative of citizens, quite the opposite, it pertains to individuals qua 
humans and it is then possible for everyone to exercise it (cf. Benhabib, 2004). As Cheneval 
claims the “deliberating demos extends to all being capable of reflexive judgment and it is 
based on fundamental rights of freedom of expression and press that are not acquired through 
citizenship” (Cheneval 2011, p. 58). In this sense Nyers (2010; 2012) argues that the very same 
requests of belonging to the polity made by the outsiders can be seen as the emergence of a 
political subjectivity. 
If we share the idea that “being political provokes acts of speaking against injustice and 
vocalizing grievances as equal beings” (Isin, 2001, p.277), we can easily understand how the 
particular vulnerable situation migrants find themselves in, gives them even more reasons 
and opportunities to speak and ask for being empowered than citizens. Indeed, the political 
12  For an argument that tries to decouple “the concept of citizenship from the nation-state in prevailing political 
thought” see Bosniak (2000).
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manifests itself under certain conditions, it is an act through which invisible claims of justice 
become visible in order to be considered and be acted upon. The very same act of struggling to 
find one’s voice is political before being institutionalized as such (cf. Isin, 2012). In the words 
of Isin, “becoming political is that moment when one constitutes oneself as being capable of 
judgment about just and unjust, takes responsibility for that judgement and associates oneself 
with or against others in fulfilling that responsibility” (Isin, 2001, p. 276). 
In Arendtian terms, especially the migrants bring something new into the world, put the 
community before unpredicted outcomes, start a change, reshape the very same community. 
With their very same appearing in the streets, disclosing themselves and claiming the respect 
of certain rights, they exercise that right, to express themselves, which is denied to them. 
Indeed “the political arises from acting together since we always disclose ourselves in the 
presence of others. We share our words and deeds” (Isin, 2012, p. 116). Undocumented 
migrants then enact themselves as critical subjects (cf. Isin, 2012), presenting a new way of 
doing politics and belonging. 
Migrants become then political in the ancient sense of the term, i.e. by acting physically in 
the city, being present and appearing in the polis – politically understood as a conjunction 
of economic and social elements. It is through actions that involve communication, be it 
demonstrations or sit-ins, that migrants enact rights of political participation they legally 
do not have. It is in this sense that conceiving the political as an act rather than as a status 
releases us from the necessary condition of being a citizen, although the political, in its 
dialogic and relational nature, requires that migrants are recognized in their humanity and 
vulnerability as individuals with needs and a plan of life worth respecting. 
To act, so to publicly participate is a requirement to be an active, full, political agent, as I 
said, and so an individual should have the opportunity to act, to be considered an active 
agent, taking the streets, demonstrating, if it is not possible to communicate otherwise. This 
then implies that even undocumented migrants must be granted the space to express those 
grievances that give them even more pressing reasons to address the power-holders to start 
with. Regardless of whether or not the state agrees with their claims, the state should protect, 
by adopting legal measures, the expression of undocumented migrants as human beings and 
autonomous agents. 
In the end, understanding political agency as an act rather than as a status has more than one 
implication. One is that individuals can be potential political agents or full, active political 
agent, while at the same time exhibiting different degrees of political agency. The other is that 
to be a political agent, one does not need to be recognized by others as a legal participant to 
the nation, through e.g. the granting of certain voting rights. What matters is the recognition, 
which requires legal protection, as a human being that one can demand by already enacting 
her right of participation. 
Such a “claimed” recognition derives from one’ s moral right to be treated with dignity and 
respect as a person who has needs and a plan of life and as an agent capable of making moral 
judgments. In other words, individuals, even undocumented residents, deserve to be listened 
in order to honour fundamental rights and their autonomy as self-deciders, capable of forming 
deep moral beliefs to be expressed through public speeches, sit-in or other forms of public 
and associative appearance. The very same concept of autonomy jeopardizes the concepts 
of sovereignty and territory (Rajagopal, 2003), perfectly paving the way to participation 
for undocumented migrants. Certainly, autonomy is a particular important human interest 
(Griffin, 2008), and its recognition is vital for pursuing a worthwhile life, and to reinforce the 
social bases of self-respect. In addition, we already have, as human beings, certain legally 
recognized human rights which should constitute a ground to grant a right to participate – 
and so a reason to be listened to – even to those who are de jure excluded, at least in those 
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decisions which call these very same rights into question14. This, and the respect owed to their 
autonomy should be the ground to recognize these individuals as subjects of justice, political 
in their appearing in the polis, as human beings voicing their demands before a community.
Recognizing to migrants the right to express themselves in public fora is what is required to 
treat them and recognize them as fellow human beings and not as mere objects of deportation. 
To respect them means to grant them a voice, regardless of their membership and regardless 
of future decisions about their permanence. All of this does not require voting rights, but 
it implies putting in place safeguards against violence and mistreatment, at the same time 
avoiding checking the legal status of those who convene in the public space to participate. 
What really matters is that the state secures the public space of appearance to undocumented 
migrants, leaving them free to express their grievances without using force against them. The 
state should stop to treat migrants as mere objects and starts engaging with them in a dialogue 
which expresses respect for their own agency and their righteous claims. 
By putting in place these measures the state will prove that it respects the human rights of 
these individuals and their moral status.
Migrants act, and by doing so they affirm they have a right to speak as human beings entitled 
to a certain treatment that involves giving them a voice to precisely claim their human rights. 
And, again borrowing from Arendt, by acting they become genuinely free, by acting they 
become full individuals in dialogue with others, they become polites. Polites are those who 
live in the city, who create links with others, who create and deliberate, social animals par 
excellence. For such a dialogue to set things into motion and be the beginning of something 
new, it has to have the occasion to occur in the first place. Institutions should then grant 
undocumented migrants the right to express themselves, to address issues that affect them 
qua individuals. 
The locus of justice shifts: it is not anymore within the community defined by citizenship, 
but with individuals (cf. Naishtat, 2012). “Persons, not citizens, are the proper subjects of 
political morality” (Song, 2009, p.613), the very same idea of recognition “should be based 
on personhood”. Individuals are then the final unit of moral concern (Pogge, 1992). The 
metamorphosis is not the one from migrant to citizen, rather from being apolitical, to becoming 
an active, or even activist agent (Isin, 2012). By being political, they become political. 
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